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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION OF GROSS INCOME
ROBERT C. BROWNt
B ASIC in the future of income taxation by the states is the
question of the constitutional validity of a state tax upon gross
income at progressive rates. For in the determination of that
question lies the answer to the important query whether exemptions
and deductions in the state acts' are to be controlled by statutory
grace or by constitutional limitation. The following discussion is
an attempt to hazard an answer to this controlling question; major
emphasis is placed upon the matter of deductions from gross income
but necessarily intertwined with this is the problem of differenti-
ating capital from income.
The principal problem which will arise in connection with state
constitutional restrictions is the so-called "equality and uniformity"
clause unfortunately common, though by no means universal, in
state constitutions. Since the application of such a clause depends
largely upon the kind of tax in question, it is necessary in the first
place to determine the nature of the income tax. This has been,
and still is, a very troublesome problem for the courts; and the
conclusions reached are by no means consistent, even with the same
court. At times an income tax is treated as essentially a personal
tax ;2 more often apparently as an excise tax,3 especially where the
taxpayer is a corporation.4 There has been a growing understand-
ing of the fact that the income tax cannot well be put in any definite
t Professor of Law, University of Indiana.
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mrs. Mary C. McNeely
of Bloomington, Indiana, for extensive and valuable assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1 The provisions now existing in state income taxes on exemptions and de-
ductions are exhaustively outlined in Neuhoff, supra this issue, p. 185. [Ed.]
2 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
3 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920) ; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robert-
son, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 (1921); State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, etc. R. R., 138
Miss. 70, 104 So. 689 (1925). Of. O'Connell v. State Board, 95 Mont. 91, 25 P.
(2d) 114 (1934), where the court after approving the statement that an income
tax is sui generis added that it is "in the nature of an excise tax".
4 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
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category, and that it is really sui generis5 Thus the Indiana
Appellate Court has held6 that an income tax is neither an excise
nor a property tax but "an assessment against one's personal
income", whatever that means.
Inasmuch as the equality and uniformity clauses of state con-
stitutions are generally held to apply only to property taxes, the
fundamental problem for consideration here is simply as to
whether an income tax is a property tax. There is considerable
authority so holding. Even the Federal Supreme Court originally
so held, in deciding that a tax on income derived from property
was essentially a tax on property and, therefore, a direct tax,
required to be apportioned prior to the Sixteenth Amendment.7
The Court at times seems still to adhere to this view,' although
there are other decisions which it is impossible to reconcile with
such a theory.' A number of state courts have, however, main-
tained this position with more or less consistency."0 It is evident
that these states cannot have an income tax at progressive rates,
whether it be based upon net or gross income; such a tax would
violate the uniformity and equality clauses of their state constitu-
tions, which would certainly seem to prevent a graduated property
tax." Such a state, if it desires an effective income tax, must
follow the example of the Federal Government and amend its con-
5 See Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax (1933) 14 Minn. L. J. 127. See
also, State ex rel. Moon Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 166 Wis. 287, 163 N. W.
639 (1917); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
6 Owen v. Fletcher Savings, etc. Co, 99 Ind. App. 365, 189 N. E. 173 (1934).
7 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 424, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
8 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S. 1 (1916).
9 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924), holding that a United States citizen,
resident and having all his property in Mexico, is subject to United States
income tax; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932), holding that
a state may tax a resident upon all his income, though derived from sources
outside the state.
:1 Typical cases are: Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492,
86 So. 56 (1920); Bachrach v. Nelson, 394 Ill. 579, 182 N. E. 909 (1932);
Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933). Notable among the
states taking this view is Massachusetts: Tax Comm'r v. Putnam, 227 Mass.
522, 116 N. E. 904 (1917); Maguire v. Tax Comm'r, 230 Mass. 503, 120 N. E.
162 (1918), aff'd, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); Knights v. Treas. and Receiver Geu'l,
237 Mass. 493, 130 N. E. 60 (1921); Eaton, etc. Co. v. Commonwealth, 237
Mass. 523, 130 N. B. 99 (1921) ; Bryant v. Comm'r, 197 N. E. 509 (Mass. 1935).
31 Knights v. Treas. and Receiver Gen'l, 237 Mass. 523, 130 N.E. 60 (1921).
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stitution so as expressly to provide for an income tax at graduated
rates, as Massachusetts and some other states have done. Where
the amendment takes the usual form, referring merely to "income
taxes" or "taxes imposed upon incomes", there is some possibility
that judicial interpretation will limit its scope to net income
taxation, thus leaving taxes on gross income and on capital subject
to property tax restrictions." But such an amendment clearly
permits a net income tax at graduated rates; and the problem of
the validity of a progressive gross income tax may well depend
basically upon the interpretation of certain provisions of the
Federal Constitution to be hereafter considered.
With the majority of states which have now reached the con-
clusion that an income tax is not a property tax,"3 the equality and
uniformity clauses are presumably not applicable. For such states
there would therefore appear to be, so far as state constitutions
are concerned, no obstacle to progressive taxation of income. 4 But
even here a distinction is sometimes made between a net income
tax and a gross income tax. This is well brought out by Redfield
v. Fisher"5 where the Oregon court held a tax on the net income of
12 On the judicial definition of "income" as meaning net or gross, see the
discussion of federal and state views infra this article, pp. 258-261. Of. also
State v. United States Express Co., 60 N. H. 219 (1880), discussed infra this
article, p. 262; in view of the New Hampshire court's attitude in this case it
is possible it would condemn a gross income tax at graduated rates even though
the state constitution were so amended as clearly to permit net income taxation.
For the possibility that even after amendment taxation of "capital" would
not be tolerated at progressive rates, see the discussion of Comm'r v. Simmon,
198 N. E. 741 (Mass. 1935), in Traynor, infra this issue, at p. 281 [Ed.]; also
Norris v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 205 Wis. 626, 237 N. W. 113, 238 N.W. 415
(1931); Rottschaefer, The Minnesota State Income Tax (1933) 18 Minn. L.
Rev. 93, 124-125.
13 See cases cited in notes 3, 5 and 6, supra; also State ex rel Moon Co. v.
Wisconsin Tax Comm., 166 Wis. 287, 163 N. W. 639 (1917) ; Young v. Illinois
Athletic Club, 310 Ill. 75, 144 N. E. 369 (1923); Standard Lumber Co. v.
Pierce, 112 Ore. 314, 228 Pac. 812 (1924); Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co.,
204 N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397 (1933).
14 But see State v. United States Express Co., 60 N. H. 219 (1880), discussed
infra this article, p. 262, where a uniform gross receipts tax aws invalidated
because not "proportional" as required by the New Hampshire Constitution.
It would seem on principle that the requirement of proportionality, like the
equality and uniformity restriction, should apply only to property taxes. And
of..also Sims v. Aherns, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925), cited and quoted
infra note 73.
15 135 Ore. 180, 292 Pac. 813 (1930).
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corporations an excise tax, but a tax on the gross income of indi-
viduals a property tax both on the property from which the income
was derived and on the income itself as property. The individual
gross income tax was, therefore, held invalid as discriminatory
with respect both to property and to corporations. Perhaps the
court was thinking of the distinction more as one between a tax
on corporations (which may always be regarded as an excise tax)'
and a tax on individuals; but the reasoning is at least partly based
upon the distinction between a net and gross income tax. Certain
it is that some courts seem to regard a net income tax as not neces-
sarily a property tax and to regard a gross income tax as a tax
upon the property from which the income is derived.'
So far as a gross income tax is in fact an income tax, there does
not seem to be much justification for this. Undoubtedly a gross
income tax is a greater burden upon the taxpayer and upon his
property than is a net income tax; but this is after all merely a
matter of degree-a problem which will be more fully discussed
hereafter. On the other hand, it is entirely clear that what is un-
doubtedly a property tax may masquerade as a gross income tax.
This is so if the so-called gross income tax is in lieu of property
taxes, the purpose being merely to compute the value of the
property through the income which it earns. It would appear
that even under the restrictions imposed by equality and uniformity
clauses certain property may be taxed in this manner when it is
believed that a computation on the basis of gross income will give
a more accurate valuation than a valuation in the more usual
manner.'8 Furthermore, it has been held that a tax may be
measured by gross income and still be a property tax. 9
Nevertheless, the situation with respect to equality and uni-
formity and similar provisions of state constitutions seems rela-
tively clear. If an income tax is regarded as a property tax, such
provisions prevent a graduated income tax, whether such tax be
16 See note 4, supra, and text to which it is appended.
17 State v. United States Express Co., 60 N. H. 219 (1880), discussed infra;
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bradley, 83 S. C. 418, 65 S. E. 433 (1909);
Hobart Estate Co. v. State Board, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 328, 36 P. (2d) 407 (1934).
But of. Mutual Reserve, etc. Ass'n v. Augusta, 109 Ga. 73, 35 S. E. 71 (1900),
which seems to deny the validity of this distinction.
'8 Foster v. Hart, etc. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 122 Pae. 48 (1913). Cf.
Michigan Central R. R. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 (1906).
19 Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933).
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based upon net or gross income. If, on the other hand, an income
tax is regarded as not a property tax, the equality and uniformity
provisions of the state constitutions should have no bearing. The
same would seem to be true if a state which regards the income
tax as a property tax has amended its constitution so as to permit
an income tax at progressive rates. In either case, a net income
tax at progressive rates is justified by the state constitution; and
it would seem, despite some scattered judicial language tending to
the contrary, that a gross income tax at progressive rates should
likewise be justifiable, so far as the state constitution is concerned.
The main problem as to the validity of a state gross income tax
at graduated rates in such jurisdictions, therefore, would seem to
be its consistency with the provisions of the Federal Constitution.
This problem must now be considered.
While the validity or invalidity of progressive gross income
taxation by the states will turn primarily upon the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, consideration must also be given
to the effect of the Commerce Clause.2" Under the well settled
doctrine that a state tax determined to impose an unreasonable
burden upon interstate or foreign commerce will be held unconsti-
tutional as violating this clause,2 there is now no doubt of the
invalidity of a state tax upon gross income derived from foreign
or interstate commerce,22 although a state gross income tax limited
to income from intra-state commerce clearly is not an offender."
The only exception to this rule of invalidity is in the situation
where a gross income tax is laid in lieu of one upon the property
of a carrier; in such case the impost is essentially a property tax.24
Even a tax upon gross earnings from interstate or foreign com-
20 The provision of the Federal Constitution requiring uniformity of excise
taxes need not, be considered in this connection, since it relates only to federal
taxes and has no bearing whatever upon state taxes. Even as to federal tax-
ation its effect is to require merely geographical uniformity. Patton v. Brady,
184 U. S. 608 (1902); Bromley v. MeCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1929).
21 See Brown, Restrictions on State Taxation Because of Interference with
Federal Functions (1931) 14 Va. L. Rev. 325.
22 Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 (1912); Crew Levick Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 (1917); Galveston, etc. By. v. Davidson, 93 S. W.
436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906). State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (U. S.
1872), must be deemed to be overruled, so far as it decides to the contrary.
23 Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914).
24Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895); State v. United States
Express Co., 114 Minn. 346, 131 N.W. 489 (1911), aff'd, 223 U. S. 335 (1912).
[VOL,. 22
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION OF GBOSS INCOME
merce seems also to be unconstitutional." However, a tax upon
gross earnings or gross sales which are not the direct product of
interstate or foreign commerce is not necessarily unconstitutional
merely because the taxpayer is engaged in such commerce.2 "
Quite different is the rule with respect to a net income tax. It
seems to be well settled that a state may validly impose a net income
tax upon income derived directly from interstate or foreign com-
merce. The burden of such a tax upon the commerce is not con-
sidered sufficiently heavy to invalidate the tax. The reasoning by
which this result is reached is well shown by the leading case of
United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,27 as follows:
"The difference in effect between a tax measured by gross receipts
and one measured by net income, recognized by our decisions, is
manifest and substantial, and it affords a convenient and workable
basis of distinction between a direct and immediate burden upon
the business affected and a charge that is only indirect and inci-
dental. A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in
proportion to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profit-
able or otherwise. Conceivably it may be sufficient to make the
difference between profit and loss, or to so diminish the profit as
to impede or discourage the conduct of the commerce. A tax upon
the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since it does not
arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and
losses, and the tax cannot be heavy unless the profits are large."'
In the sense that unconstitutionality clearly depends upon the
nature of the tax and not upon its rate, these commerce cases do not
bear directly on the question of the validity of progressive gross
income taxation. But if a state gross income tax at a uniform rate
upon income from interstate or foreign commerce is unconstitu-
tional as burdening that commerce, a gross income tax at pro-
gressive rates must also as clearly be unconstitutional; and this
fact means that an additional constitutional pitfall lurks in the
path of those states which do not hew to something like true net
income in the administration of their progressive income tax laws.
Furthermore, these Commerce Clause authorities are, by the same
token, of aid in that difficult problem of defining the distinction
25 State v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N. W. 221 (1920). See
also MeKenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651 (1898).
26 Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
27 247 U. S. 321 (1918). See also Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N. C.
365, 168 S. E. 397 (1933).
28 United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328-329 (1918).
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between a gross income and a net income tax; and some of them
will be referred to again in that connection.
More significant certainly to the "controlling question of the con-
stitutional validity of state gross income taxation at graduated
rates is the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite an absurd, and now
thoroughly repudiated, idea of Mr. Chief Justice White that the
corresponding provision of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion did not restrict the federal taxing power, 9 there seems never
to have been any doubt that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment restricts the state taxing power. Thus it
requires that state income taxes be properly apportioned as to tax-
payers doing business in other states than the one imposing the
tax;3 and it also prohibits, or at least rigidly restricts, multiple
taxation by different states of the same economic interest.8 ' It may
be added that the question whether the due process clause prohibits
multiple income taxation is, as yet, not definitely settled;2 but
there is no doubt that such taxation cannot be sustained unless it
is considered to constitute due process of law. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the limitation of due process in taxation is primarily
one affecting taxation by more than one jurisdiction. Progressive
and even retroactive excise83 and income' taxation have been
sustained under the due process clauses, though undoubtedly there
must be some limit to this. Clearly the problem of the validity
of a progressive state tax on gross income is primarily one of the
meaning of the equal protection clause.
While the equal protection clause is undoubtedly a limitation
upon the state taxing power, it has never been regarded as requiring
29 Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914) ; Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R. RI., 240 U. S. 1 (1916).
80 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920) ; Maxwell
v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397 (1933).
31 See Brown, Multipla Taxation by the "3tates-What is Left of it (1935)
48 Harv. L. Rev. 407.
82 It has been held that a state may tax a resident upon all his income from
whatever source derived. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
However, there is still some doubt whether this tax base can include income
from outside realty. See the discussion in Rottschaefer, infra this issue, at pp.
303 et seq., and Traynor) infra this issue, at p. 272.
3 Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608 (1902).
5 Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Appeal of Van Dyke,
217 Wis. 528, 259 N.W. 700 (1935).
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absolute uniformity; in other words, it is not a reenactment of
the equality and uniformity provisions of state constitutions. The
Federal Supreme Court has used the following emphatic and often
quoted language with respect to this matter:
"The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment, that no State shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, was not intended to prevent a State from adjusting its
system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if
it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation
at all, such as churches, libraries and the property of charitable
institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different
trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon
various products; it may tax real estate and personal property in
a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax
securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for
indebtedness or not allow them. All such regulations, and those
of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits
and general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature,
or the people of the State in framing their Constitution. But clear
and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes,
especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the
practice of our government, might be obnoxious to the constitu-
tional prohibition. It would, however, be impracticable and un-
wise to attempt to lay down any general rule or definition on the
subject, that would include all cases. They must be decided as
they arise. We think that we are safe in saying, that the Four-
teenth Amendment was not intended to compel the State to adopt
an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its proper construction,
it would not only supersede all those constitutional provisions and
laws of some of the States, whose object is to secure equality of
taxation, and which are usually accompanied with qualifications
deemed material; but it would render nugatory those discrimi-
nations which the best interests of society require; which are
necessary for the discouragement of intemperance and vice; and
which every State, in one form or another, deems it expedient to
adopt." 5
Accordingly a progressive state tax on gross income is not a
denial of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution
unless the Supreme Court considers that the progressive feature
is so seriously discriminatory as to be unjustifiable. It is, there-
fore, necessary to determine, as precisely as possible, the difference
85 Bells Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237 (1890). See also,
Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. Minneapolis, 191 Minn. 365, 254 N. W. 443
(1934). As to classification under the Fifth Amendment, which carries no
equal protection clause, see Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
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between a net income tax and a gross income tax. It will soon
appear that this distinction is by no means easy to draw either on
principle or authority.
Preliminary to essaying this task it is necessary to distinguish
between income taxes, whether gross or net, and other types of
taxes. Courts have seemed to draw a distinction between an
income tax and a tax which is not an income tax at all but merely
"measured by" income.8 But unless the tax can be regarded as
a property tax, the distinction seems wholly unrealistic." The New
York Court of Appeals has held38 that a so-called "franchise" tax
on corporations based on net income is in effect an income tax
subject to the rules applicable to such a tax; and it is submitted
that this is entirely sound. The distinction between a tax "upon"
and one "measured by" income seems to be purely verbal.
Even the distinction between a true income tax and a tax on
property measured by income is difficult to draw. The Federal
Supreme Court has said:
"Since the commercial value of property consists in the expectation
of income from it, and since taxes ultimately, at least in the long
run, come out of income, obviously taxes called taxes on property
and those called taxes on income or receipts tend to run into each
other somewhat as fair value and anticipated profits run into each
other in the law of damages.
'39
This tendency was especially apparent in the recent case of Senior
v. Braden"0 where a state tax on transferable certificates repre-
senting beneficial interests in land situated partly outside the state
but measured by income from such land was held to be a property
tax and so not sustainable even when the certificates were held by
a resident of the taxing state. Certainly the distinction between
an income and a property tax is not very evident in this situation.
It would seem that the only realistic solution is to say that a tax
measured by income, even from property, is still an income tax
except where it is in lieu of an ordinary tax upon the property.
If this is true, Senior v. Braden was wrongly decided, unless the
36 F lint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911), is the leading ease.
37 Galveston, etc. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908).
38 People x rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, '230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E.
202 (1920).
39 Galveston, etc. By. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 226 (1908).
40 295 U. S. 422 (1935).
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court is going to restrict multiple income taxation in a similar
manner to that already effected with regard to property and
inheritance taxation.4 At any rate, it does not seem necessary to
distinguish for any practical purpose between a tax "upon" and
a tax "measured by" gross income.
Another problem as to the distinction between income and other
sorts of taxes is raised by the so-called "occupation taxes". In
several cases,42 taxes measured by gross income have been regarded
as occupation taxes. However, the chief point of all this is that
such a tax is an excise rather than a property tax.4 Since excise
taxes may be imposed at a graduated rate, it seems immaterial, so
far as the present question is concerned, whether the gross income
tax is regarded as a true income tax or as an excise tax. If, how-
ever, an occupation tax is not dependent strictly upon income, but
the classification is made upon another basis, it is not an income
tax at all.44
Another denomination of taxes which appear in the statute
books and the cases is the so-called "gross receipts tax", at times
called an occupation tax43 and at other times not separately classi-
fied.4 The real problem is whether there is any distinction other
than verbal between a gross receipts tax and a gross income tax.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals apparently thinks there is, for
it has said with reference to a gross receipts tax on railways im-
posed in that state, "If the Legislature had intended this as merely
an income tax it would have imposed a tax upon incomes from all
sources, and not merely the receipts."" This statement does not
seem very lucid. If the court means that an income tax must cover
all income, then there never has been an income tax; for all net
41 See notes 31 and 32, supra, including references to discussions on this to
be found elsewhere in this issue.
42 Glascow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 (1869); Wright v. Southern Bell, etc. Co.,
127 Ga. 227, 56 S. E. 116 (1906). Of. Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W.
720 (1925), holding that a gross income tax is both an occupation and an
income tax.
42 Atlanta, etc. Ass'n v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S. E. 73 (1900).
44 Ould & Carrington v. Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464 (Va. 1873).
4 5 Lincoln Traction Co. v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 327, 121 N.W. 435 (1909). And
see cases cited in notes 42 and 43, supra.
46 State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (U. S. 1872); Hobart Estate
Co. v. State Board, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 328, 36 P. (2d) 407 (1934).
47Galveston, etc. Ry. v. Davidson, 93 S.W. 436, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
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income tax statutes, both federal and state, carry some exemptions"
and not infrequently gross income taxes are imposed only upon
certain classes of gross income."9 If, however, the court is making
a distinction between gross income and receipts, it does not specify
exactly what the difference is.
It is submitted that there is really no distinction between gross
income and gross receipts, or rather that these phrases mean the
same thing. The Illinois Supreme Court so held in State v. Ilinois
Central Railroad Co.," where it laid down the proposition that
gross income, receipts or earnings, all these terms being used
somewhat indiscriminately in the charter of the railroad, mean
exactly the same thing. As will presently appear, the court does
not seem to be correct in its statement that gross receipts and gross
earnings are identical; -otherwise, however, its position seems
realistic and sensible. No deductions for business expenses or cost
of goods sold are allowable in computing gross receipts ;5" but the
same is true of gross income.2 A further authority to the same
effect is Miles v. Department of Treasury,53 where the Indiana
Supreme Court in upholding the gross income tax of that state
declared that the term "gross income" "is understood by lexi-
cographers, and in common usage, to mean total receipts". It is
submitted, therefore, that no distinction between gross income
taxes and gross receipts taxes is necessary or proper; both are
gross income taxes for present purposes.
Another important classification of taxes of this general nature
is the sales tax. Such exactions are certainly not regarded as
identical with gross income taxes, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia is, therefore, representing the popular opinion when it
holds that a tax on the sale of oysters is not an income tax.' The
48 For discussion see Neuhoff, supra this issue, p. 185. [Ed.]
49 See Mutual Reserve, etc. Ass'n v. Augusta, 109 Ga. 73, 35 S. E. 71 (1900);
iRhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 117 S. W. 508 (1908).
ro 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814 (1910). See also, Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania
245 U. S. 292 (1917); State v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N.W. 189 (1933).
In Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 (1912), a state "gross revenue"
tax was treated by the United States Supreme Court as a gross receipts tax.
51 Sandusky Gas, etc. Co. v. State, 114 Ohio St. 479, 151 N. E. 685 (1926).
52Lawless v. Sullivan, 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 117 (1879).
53 199 N. B. 372 (Ind. 1935), appeal dism'id, 298 U. S. 640 (1936).
54 Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357 (1895). The power to
levy income taxes was limited by the state constitution.
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court merely said, "The tax is assessed on sales and not on income."
If, when one speaks of income taxes he is thinking of net income
taxes, the distinction is, of course, very clear. But the only
difference between a gross income tax and a sales tax is that the
gross income tax covers substantially all gross receipts, including
wages, salaries, and receipts from the sale of capital assets, while
the sales tax usually covers only receipts from sales by retailers in
the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, it seems that a sales
tax, based upon the total receipts from sales covered by it and
without deductions, is essentially a gross income tax-restricted,
to be sure, to one form of gross income, but a gross income tax for
all that. This problem will be further considered in connection
with cases on progressive sales taxation but it is submitted that here
too we have a distinction without more than a verbal difference.
Quite different is the situation with respect to taxes on gross
earnings or profits. These may very probably be regarded as
income taxes ;5 but they are certainly dissimilar from gross income
taxes. The difference is that a gross earnings tax permits the
deduction from the gross income of the direct cost of goods sold
or of the services rendered," though it differs from a net income
tax in not permitting the deduction of general overhead expenses
and losses on the sale of capital assets." As already seen, a gross
profits tax upon income from interstate commerce is probably
unconstitutional;"5 yet the fact remains that the burden of such a
tax is substantially less than a tax on gross income or receipts. A
progressive tax on gross earnings may therefore be constitutional
even if such a tax on gross income is not.
One other form of taxation must be considered in this connection.
This is the so-called gross production tax, frequently imposed upon
mining and similar enterprises. 9  The tax is based upon the
55 See Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 (1878).
56 People ex rel. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Morgan, 114 App. Div. 266, 99
N.Y. Supp. 711 (1906), holding that a gas company may deduct for the pur-
pose of computing its "gross earnings" subject to tax, the cost of coal used
as a material in making gas, but not the cost of coal used as a fuel for running
the plant. See also State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N. W.
221 (1920).
57 Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781 (1910).
5 State v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N. W. 221 (1920), cited
sdpra note 25.
59 Foster v. Hart, etc. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 122 Pac. 48 (1912).
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amount of minerals or other similar products actually extracted,
without regard to the value, the cost of production, or the selling
price.60 Such a tax is obviously neither a gross nor a net income tax.
But if the distinction between income and other taxes is trouble-
some, the problem of differentiating a net income tax from a gross
income tax is far more so. The average person undoubtedly regards
the distinction as rather obvious, and also thinks that an "income
tax" means a net income tax. Indeed, this common view of the
term "income tax" has been used by the courts in problems of
interpretation of tax law;61 and also, as already noted, in deter-
mining the validity of a state tax upon interstate or foreign
commerce.
62
From this it might be thought to follow that the Federal Govern-
ment is given by the Sixteenth Amendment only the power to
impose a net income tax and that it therefore has no authority
to impose a gross income tax. This is, however, by no means
certain.63 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rather clearly intimated
the contrary. Thus it has said that
"The power to tax income . . . is plain and extends to the gross
income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed
depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision
therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.""
Probably justified, then, is the conclusion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "Under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment all income, whether net or gross, may be taxed by Congress,
and the deductions allowed from gross income are given as a
matter of grace.""
While the federal situation is of no direct interest with respect
60 However, an allowance for waste is sometimes given. Stanolind, etc. Co.
v. Cornish, 16 F. Supp. 464 (W. D. Okla. 1935).
6 1 Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F. (2d) 487 (App, D. 0. 1931). See also
Tax Comm'r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 526, 116 N. E. 904, 907 (1917), where
the court said: "In its ordinary and popular meaning, 'income' is the amount
of actual wealth which comes to a person during a given period of time."
62 United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918), cited supra
note 27.
63 See Note, Taxability of Gross Income under the Sixteenth Amendment
(1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 274.
6 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440 (1934). To the
same effect is Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U. S. 371 (1934).
65 Avery v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 905, 907 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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to state taxation,66 it does have a rather direct bearing upon the
distinction between gross and net income taxes. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the definition of "gross income" is rather diffi-
cult ;67 but the proper definition of "net income" is even less clear.
To date, the Federal Government has not purported to impose
anything save a net income tax; yet in fact federal taxes have
been imposed which go a long way toward constituting taxes on
gross income or even on capital. For example, the original Cor-
poration Excise Tax of 1909, which was essentially a net income
tax,' declined to permit the deduction by mining corporations of
the depletion of their ore lands. This provision was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.,6 where
the Court conceded that the denial of such an allowance was some-
what inequitable but nevertheless held it to be within the power
of Congress. It is clear that such a tax is partly a gross income
tax and indeed a rather direct burden upon the capital of the
corporation.
While this particular deduction has been allowed by subsequent
federal income tax laws, there have frequently been provisions
limiting or disallowing deductions which would probably have to
be given in order to have a tax strictly upon net income according
to the economic conception. Indeed, the present law somewhat
rigidly limits deductions for losses on the sale of capital assets;"0
and to the extent, at least, that profits on such sales constitute
taxable income, the disallowance creates a rather distinct burden
upon capital and consequently constitutes in part a gross income
tax. It seems to follow from this either that the federal income
tax is in part based upon gross income, as the Supreme Court
indicates it can be, or else that the alleged distinction between gross
income and net income has no real practical signficance.
Some state courts have shown a similar inability to distinguish
sharply between net and gross income taxes.' Yet the distinction
66 Save as it provides authoritative precedent on the interpretation of state
constitutional amendments permitting graduated taxation of "income". See
discussion supra this article, at p. 248.
67 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 300 (1934).
68 Edwards v. Cuba R. R., 268 U. S. 628 (1925).
69 242 U. S. 503 (1917).
70 Fed. Revenue Act of 1936, § 112, 113.
71 See, e. g., Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 (1878).
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which the federal courts have made with respect to interstate and
foreign commerce is reflected by some of the state decisions. This
distinction seems to be whether the law permits the deduction of
the cost of goods sold or similar direct costs of the business. If
such a deduction is allowed, the tax is usually treated as one on
net income, even though the ordinary overhead expenses are not
permitted to be deducted.'2 If such deduction is not allowed, it is
treated as a gross income tax. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
has said:
"The rule of uniformity does not require that all subjects be taxed,
nor taxed alike. The requirement is complied with, when the tax
is levied equally and uniformly on all subjects of the same class
and kind. In doing this, some incomes might be exempted and
those taxed may be classified. It is absolutely essential to uni-
formity that the net income only should be taxed. In business
enterprises the profits are variable, and do not bear any fixed
relation to the amount of capital invested. For the reason that
the relation between the amount of capital and of profits varies
widely, a tax on gross profits would necessarily operate in a dis-
criminatory manner and be arbitrary."
In somewhat similar vein, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
has declared, in passing upon a statute of that state imposing a
tax upon "gross receipts", that
"While considering the law in its economic phases it is perhaps
well to note that, notwithstanding the appearance of the word
'income' in the title of this act and at various places throughout
the corpus of the act, it is not in any sense whatsoever an 'income
tax law' as the economist customarily employs that phrase. For
the economist, as well as for the lawyer, the phrase 'income tax
law' signifies the type of act that is sometimes more definitely
called a 'net income tax law', wherein the measure of the tax (and
possibly both the subject and the measure) is the net gain or profit
of the taxpayer over a given interval of time. The true measure
of the present tax is not income at all in any proper sense of the
word, but gross receipts, a very different and much broader signifi-
cation which this act itself undertakes, by definition in section
1 (g), to impose upon the phrase 'gross income'. It is extremely
unfortunate that the word 'income' should find a place in either
the title or the body of a law of this type, for it is entirely mis-
leading (even if unintentionally so) and can only tend to confusion
72 Cf. People ex rel. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Morgan, 114 App. Div. 266,
99 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1906).
72 Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 584, 271 S.W. 720, 729 (1925). And of.
Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Ore. 180, 292 Pac. 813 (1930).
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of thought. Henceforth, in this discussion we shall use the phrase
'income tax' as signifying a net income tax, and to designate the
measure of the tax attempted to be set up in the present law we
shall employ the term 'gross receipts'."'74
It is submitted that not all of this rather typical language is
entirely sound. Granting that "income" normally means net
income, yet, after all, this is merely a matter of terminology which
can be of no consequence if the legislature has otherwise made its
meaning plain. And to assert that an income tax law, which
permits the deduction of only the direct expenses of the business,
necessarily insures that no tax will be due unless a profit is realized
is not necessarily correct; the overhead charges and other non-
deductible expenses may wipe out the profit otherwise realized
and which is yet taxable. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a
substantial distinction between the income tax statute which per-
mits such a deduction of direct costs of goods sold or similar
expenses and one which does not. Conceding that even in the
former case a tax may be due without a profit, yet this will be
unusual, and normally there is no tax without a profit. Accordingly
it seems realistic to treat as a net income tax law any income tax
statute allowing deduction of the cost of goods sold or similar
direct expenses, even though it restricts or absolutely prohibits the
deduction of overhead and other indirect expenses and of all losses
on the sales of capital assets. In other words, even a gross profits
tax is to be treated for this purpose as a net income tax.
Net income taxes have frequently been imposed at graduated
rates, and it is entirely settled that such a tax is constitutional, at
least if any income tax is."5 South Carolina's sustainment of a
gross profits tax at graduated rates"8 is in accord, for the tax in
question, in providing that gross profits were to be computed by
deducting from gross income, business expenses but nothing else,
was strictly a net income tax under the distinctions above drawn.
74 State v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 614, 251 N. W. 189, 198 (1933).
75 State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912); State v. Johnson,
170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589 (1919) ; Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112 Ore.
314, 228 Pac. 812 (1924); Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.W. (2d) 1000
(1929); Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S. E. 58 (1930); Bacon v.
Ranson, 331 Mo. 985, 56 S.W. (2d) 786 (1932). On the favorable attitude
of the Federal Supreme Court see Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Note
(1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 582, 585.
76 Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781 (1910).
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In State v. United States Express Co., on the other hand, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court upset even a uniform two per cent tax
upon the gross receipts of express companies; the reason assigned
was that such a tax was not "proportional" as prescribed by the
state constitution. The court said:
"Gross receipts of one company may be small and net profits large;
while of another, gross receipts may be large and profits small
. . ., or there may be none at all. It [the statute] makes no allow-
ance for skill, experience, business tact, or enterprise of the owners
or managers. . . . It is a tax which one class of men are required
to pay and from which all others are exempt.""5
An attempt is thus made to draw a sharp, though not entirely
accurate, distinction between gross and net income taxes. It is to
be noted, however, that in the court's view a net income tax, at
uniform and even more clearly at graduated rates, would likewise
not be "proportional". The decision, therefore, in assuming to
condemn a gross income tax, appears to condemn all income taxes
and regardless of the graduation of rates. Generally, however,
taxes upon gross income as here defined have been successfully
imposed at a uniform rate."9 We come then to the direct question
in issue. Assuming a gross income tax as previously defined, which
will be sustained if at a uniform rate, can it be imposed at gradu-
ated rates without violation of the Federal Constitution?
Assuming that a gross income tax is an excise tax, the problem
arises as to whether excise taxes can be imposed at graduated rates.
The answer would appear to be in the affirmative. It is possible
to impose at graduated rates not only inheritance taxes"0 but also
other varities of excise taxes8' exacted directly of business. The
most conspicuous recent example of this is the chain store tax
where steeply graduated rates, obviously often intended to drive
chain stores out of business, have nevertheless been generally
77 60 N. H. 219 (1880).
781d. at 244-245.
70 Though not infrequently gross income of different classes is taxed at
different rates. See Glascow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 (1869); Miles v. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 199 N. E. 372 (Ind. 1935), dism'g5, 56 S. Ct. 750 (1936).
o
8 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1898); Keeney
v. New York, 222 U. S. 525 (1912).
8 1 Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890); see also Clark v.
Titusville, 184 U. S. 329 (1902), which will be considered herearter.
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sustained. 2 If the gross income tax is to be treated as an excise
tax, these cases would seem certainly to justify reasonably gradu-
ated rates.3 And if the gross income tax is not an excise tax, it is
sui generis, but certainly not subject to more stringent restrictions.
The authority already referred to,' that a tax on gross profits
may be levied at a graduated rate without violating the equal
protection clause or any other part of the Federal Constitution, is
only a state court decision, but seems, nevertheless, to be sound.
Yet because a tax on gross profits may be regarded for this purpose
as a tax on net income, since it normally, though perhaps not
invariably, falls within the usual judicial requirement that it be
not payable unless a profit is derived from the business, this case
is not a square authority that a gross income tax can be imposed
at graduated rates. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana8"
is a Federal Supreme Court decision to the effect that a state gross
income tax imposed upon sugar refiners is valid though it exempts
from the tax those who refine only cane grown by themselves. Here
too there was not involved a gross income tax at graduated rates;
but the decision is a federal authority that certain distinctions
may validly be made in the imposition of such a tax, apart from
the amount of the gross income itself.
More squarely in point is Clark v. Titusville,"8 where the Court
upheld a municipal license tax on merchants at rates graduated
according to the amount of gross sales. The opinion is not very
helpful as it relies without much discussion upon cases sustaining
a graduated inheritance tax." Nevertheless, this seems to be a
definite authority since, as already shown, a tax on gross sales is
in fact a gross income tax, differing from the conventional form
of gross income tax only in that the basis of the tax is restricted
to gross income from retail sales. The decision in the Clark case,
82 State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931); Fox v.
Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 16 F. Supp. 499 (E. D. La. 1936).
83 Mills v. State Board, 97 Mont. 13, 33 P. (2d) 563 (1934), would limit the
rates of a net income tax to what is reasonable.
84 Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781 (1910), cited supra note 76.
85 179 U. S. 89 (1900).
86184 U. S. 329 (1902).
8 7 Especially, Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1898).
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therefore, seems a direct precedent for the rule that a state may
impose a gross income tax at reasonably graduated rates.'
This idea appears, however, to have received its death blow in
the recent decision of Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis.89 Here,
the problem was as to the constitutionality of a state of Kentucky
tax measured by gross sales. The rate varied from '/2o of 1% on
gross sales of $400,000 or less, up to 1% on gross sales of over
$1,000,000. While this is a considerable graduation, yet it will be
noticed that it would never be possible for a taxpayer to pay as
much as 1% on his total gross, since sales up to that amount were
taxable at lower rates.
The majority of the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Roberts, held
the statute unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution; in this Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented
in an able opinion with which Justices Brandeis and Stone con-
curred. The opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts is not particularly
lucid or satisfactory. Primarily, he seems to be disturbed by the
possibility of a taxpayer being compelled to pay a tax on gross sales
when the business was actually conducted at a loss.90 For example,
he says:
"We are told that the gross sales tax in question is in truth a rough
and ready method of taxing gains under the guise of taxing sales;
that it is less complicated and more convenient bf administration
than an income tax; and Kentucky for these reasons is at liberty
to choose this form, and to ignore the consequent inequalities of
burden in the interest of ease of administration. The argument is
in essence that it is difficult to be just and easy to be arbitrary.
If the commonwealth desires to tax incomes, it must take the
trouble equitably to distribute the burden of the impost. Gross
inequalities may not be ignored for the sake of ease of collection."'"
Undoubtedly this argument is not without force; but it is subject
to at least tw6 objections. In the first place, as has already been
shown, the ordinary net income (including the one imposed by the
Federal Government itself) does not permit all deductions which
are probably necessary to make it strictly a net income tax; conse-
quently it conceivably, though, it must be admitted, quite im-
probably, makes possible the imposition of a tax in the absence of
88 But see Posados v. Warner, Barnes & Co., 279 U. S. 340, 343 (1929).
89 294 U.S. 550 (1935).
00 Cf. quotations cited in notes 28 and 78, supra.
91 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 559-560 (1935).
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net profits, and therefore one which is substantially on capital.
Furthermore, statistics presented in this very case showed that net
profits followed gross income with a rather high degree of accuracy.
The correspondence is, of course, not exact; but neither is the
correspondence between actual profits and the statutory net income
as defined in practically any so-called net income tax statute. 2
It would seem, therefore, that on principle, the case reaches the
wrong result, unless indeed the graduation of rates is regarded as
too steep-a matter which is not even mentioned by the Court.
Perhaps more illuminating than this is the effort of the court to
distinguish Clark v. Tituswile."3  An entire page in the official
report' is given to the attempt to make this distinction; but it
does not seem to be very successful. Apparently the only difference
the Court can find is that in the ordinance approved in the Clark
case the graduation was expressed in dollars, whereas the Kentucky
statute invalidated in the Stewart case computed the graduated
rates of taxes on a percentage basis. That is to say, the Titusville
ordinance imposed a tax at (say) 5c on a hundred dollars, whereas
the Kentucky statute imposed the tax at '/20 of one per cent. If
this is more than a verbal distinction, it certainly escapes the notice
of anyone except possibly the members of the Court. It is sub-
mitted that Clark v. Titusvffle is not distinguished; it is really
overruled.95
The question remains whether the Stewart case is applicable to
gross income taxes. In one place Mr. Justice Roberts talks as if
it is not. He says:
"As we have said, the statute does not purport to levy a tax on
incomes. Plainly it does not in fact do so. A merchant having a
gross business of $1,000,000, but a net loss, must pay a greater tax
than one who has a gross business of $400,000 and realizes a sub-
stantial net profit."'
Plainly, however, the Justice has in mind the distinction between
gross income and net income taxes, using "income" to refer to the
92 See the discussion by Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting, id. at 570-571.
93 184 U. S. 329 (1902), cited supra note 86.
9 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 564 (1935).
05 The effect on Clark v. Titusville and other results of the Stewart Dry Goods
,decision are considered in Note, Classification for Taxation--Stewart Dry
6oods Co. v. Lewis (1935) 21 Iowa L. Rev. 93. [Ed.]
96 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 IT. S. 550, 560 (1935).
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latter. This is shown by the fact that later in his opinion"7 he cites
a number of state sales tax laws at uniform rates as "a practical
confirmation of the view that they are effective measures". In this
list is included at least one state general gross income tax,"3 which
is evidently regarded as a sales tax so far as it covers gross income
from retail sales. It is believed that this constitutes an admission
by the Court that the principle which it lays down invalidating
a gross sales tax at graduated rates is logically and practically
applicable to any gross income tax. Accordingly the Stewart case
must be regarded as an authority that a state may not levy a gross
income tax at graduated rates, on the ground that this violates the
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
The doctrine of the Stewart case was confirmed by the still more
recent decision of Valentine v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,"
where the Court in a per curiam decision affirmed a decree of a
district court in Iowa invalidating in part a tax statute of that
state."' The precise nature of the Iowa tax can be ascertained
from the full report of the case in the lower court.' The Iowa
statute is especially interesting because imposing two sorts of taxes,
somewhat independent but to a large extent having a similar scope.
The first one of these was a graduated tax upon chain stores. This
tax was sustained."2 There was also levied a graduated tax "based
on the combined gross receipts of each person on all of said business,
of each and all stores within this state". The graduation ran up
to 10 per cent but only on gross receipts over $9,000, so that no
litigating taxpayer was able to show a tax liability over 5 per cent
of his gross receipts. It may be noted that the graduation of rates
was expressed on the basis of actual amount of tax rather than on
a percentage basis; this seems to do away with the distinction made
071d. at 563.
03 The Indiana Gross Income Tax of 1933, which covers practically all gross
income subject to the state's jurisdiction to tax. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§§ 64-2601 et seq. See Miles v. Department of Treasury, 199 N. E. 372 (id.
1935), dism'd, 56 S. Ct. 760 (1936).
03 57 S. Ct. 56 (1936).
100 The Court's only comment was that "The decree is affirmed upon the
authority of Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis."
10' 12 F. Supp. 760 (S. D. Iowa 1935).
102 Upon the authority of State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S.
527 (1931), cited supra note 82, and cases following it.
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in the Stewart case as to Clark v. Titusvile, and further to demon-
strate that that case has been overruled.
Since this Iowa gross receipts tax was confined to receipts from
stores, it, like the Kentucky statute, constitutes only a gross sales
tax; but this in itself gives further evidence that neither legis-
latures nor courts have found any very definite distinction between
gross sales taxes, gross receipts taxes, and gross income taxes. It
was this sales tax which, because of its graduated character, was
held unconstitutional by the federal district court, whose decision
was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Thus the case demonstrates
the present position of the Supreme Court to be that a state tax
based upon gross income cannot constitutionally be imposed at
progressive rates, no matter how conservative the schedule of
graduation. But while this appears to be the law, the attitude of
the Court seems unreasonable and unsound; for on principle it is
difficult to see wherein a gross income tax at reasonably graduated
rates violates the equal protection concept of the Federal Con-
stitution.
